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… and then I got off the bus 
 
A slow, long pull back of the camera allows us to see the true extent of Charles Foster 
Kane’s obsessive collecting. The wider angle (as we move vertically towards heaven) 
brings us closer to our revelation; the landscape of an isolated man replacing human 
companions with statue stand-ins. Pull back and reveal.  
 
Citizen Kane operates through contrasting modes of storytelling, from newsreel to 
personal monologues, using a ‘prismatic’ narrative1 to describe one man’s life (as analogy 
for American culture at large). We observe the difficulty and unreliability in attempting 
to author an autobiography post-mortem, while simultaneously being aware that if Kane 
had written his own life-story, it would have been full of similar ambiguity. Ultimately, 
the struggle between truth and knowledge is at its center. As the camera zooms back in 
again during that last scene, mirroring the previous pull back motion, we see the second 
concealed truth; Kane’s deathbed utterance of ‘Rosebud’ is a reference to his childhood 
sled. We see it thrown into a furnace for destruction but the knowledge remains 
allusive to the films interlocutors. 
 
As well as a filmic and cinematic device (employed since the film camera could be made 
mobile), ‘pull back and reveal’ as an artistic trope, may have come originally from radio 
comedy, where detailed descriptions were used to hold suspense, revealing a change of 
context through a final linguistic turn. This kind of reveal is one that relies on its re-
alignment of the audience’s assumptions. It importantly differs from its use in Citizen 
Kane, in that the intention is for humour. 
 
"I was sitting there, minding my own business, naked, smeared with salad dressing and 
lowing like an ox ... and then I got off the bus."2 It is, as with any formula, often 
hackneyed and overdone. The comedian Stewart Lee describes it is a, “one size fits all” 
mechanism – mass-produced predominantly for the British market. But, its function in 
comedy is interesting to analyse. 
 
The technique alludes to several theories of humour – in its ‘making us seem stupid in 
our assumptions’ we may wonder if we are the subject of an Aristotelian theory 
(laughing at our foolish assumptions), as an incongruity (between the real and the 
conceptualized) or as a form of benign violation3. In each theory, the joke constructs 
one image, suddenly shattered and immediately re-contextualised. In this twist, it is both 
tortuous, being always out of reach, yet humorous. The temporary withholding of the 
wide angle, the reveal of how mistaken we are as an audience, operates under the 
context of a benign space designated for humour – we know it is coming, the ‘real’ 
image. Is it really that benign a violation? 
 
The withholding or withdrawal of knowledge under other communicable exchanges has 
the affect of precisely not being laughable. In Hannah Arendt’s thesis Ethics and Politics 4, 
what drives her concern about the loss of truth in politics, is that: 
When truth telling is impossible, when truth disappears, when the world 
wobbles, the result is cynicism. If people begin to believe that there is no 
truth, that all is image-making and spin, that there is a loss of the common 
world, then there is no ground upon which a people in public can form a 
world together. 5  
 
There is no reveal, each pull back repeats the previous image and so we become cynics 
– the formula, the mechanism, is after all a form of manipulation. The cynic sees the 
stories of fraud and turns them into a space in which to believe in truth is naïve and a 
commonality of agreement is impossible without undeniable truth. Can a common 
sense be found today? 
 
Simon Critchley writes that humour allows for a form of sensus communis, but 
interestingly, it does this by initially withdrawing from the common sense world. “If 
humour recalls us to sensus communis, then it does this by momentarily pulling us out of 
common sense, where jokes function as moments of what we may call dissensus 
communis”. 6 Critchley focuses his discussion on the analogy to taste and Kantian 
aesthetics rather than its ethics or politics (as derived in Arendt). But the notion of a 
sensus communis is the language of a political rhetoric that takes a singular, concrete 
community and denies plurality (postmodernist’s such as Lyotard claim there can as 
such be no sensus communis7). Politics does often directly engage humour as an attempt 
to ‘speak the language of the common people’, to recall politics as ‘human’, indeed, 
Charles Kane used this rhetoric in his failed attempts at political reformation. 
Unfortunately, the consequences are often of merely re-enforcing a stereotype or 
division that categorises rather than individuates the subject, the space demarcated for 
political exchange may then be understood differently – an un-benign one. In 2010, 
when openly gay MP Chris Bryan quizzed the chancellor (Osbourne) in the Commons 
on his austerity plans, calling him Baron Hardup, he received the retort “at least I’m not 
the pantomime dame” – queue laughter in the Commons, but not a common laughter. 
 
What of those who don’t ‘get’ the joke? When the joke doesn’t work or is miss-
understood it incites an uncomfortable tension, foregrounding deficiency in the 
aesthetic, democratic ideal of the shared joke. It is anger brought about through 
exclusion, being left outside in the dark without privilege to the inner knowledge of the 
commune. In opposition, one can say that inclusion is also neutralization. To become 
one who “laughs along”, you must first subscribe to a particular system of class, belief or 
structure that invites you to relinquish resistance. Dave Beech has highlighted a similar 
problem in the relationship between participation practices (of which humour seems to 
fit as a parallel, a tool for sociability) and the political fissure that runs through them, 
using Rancière, Butler and Derrida as tools to unpack this.8 
 
With humour we cannot announce the intention before the action, or else loose the 
affect (somewhat like trying to analyse humour). The shifts in context required of the 
pull back and reveal technique, for example, would become null and void. As Beech 
writes, “the changes we need are structural.” To pull back and reveal the ‘true’ image, 
one needs also to pull back and reveal the structure, the mechanism. He hints at the 
way in which the invitation occurs or is structured in the first instance and the methods 
of how we are asked to join in, its ethical grounding. Certainly, it requires a humour 
more complex than a simple formula ending with ‘…and then I got off the bus’. It is 
through the motion of pulling back and focusing in where we oscillate between 
revealing and withdrawing that allows freedom. Kant described the joke as a play of 
thoughts that suddenly ends in nothingness.9  How we populate nothingness, how we 
can build a new structure out of the ‘nothingness’, could be more important. 
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